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Disorders of agency could be described as cases where people 
encounter difficulties in assessing their own degree of responsibility 
or involvement with respect to a relevant action or event. These 
disturbances in one’s sense of agency appear to be meaningfully 
connected with some mental disorders and with some symptoms in 
particular—i.e. auditory verbal hallucinations, thought insertion, 
pathological guilt. A deeper understanding of these experiences may 
thus contribute to better identification and possibly treatment of 
people affected by such disorders. In this paper I explore disorders of 
agency to flesh out their phenomenology in more detail as well as to 
introduce some theoretical distinctions between them. Specifically, I 
argue that we may better understand disorders of agency by 
characterizing them as dimensional. In §1 I explore the cases of 
Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVH) and pathological guilt and I 
show that they lie at opposite ends of the agency spectrum (i.e. 
hypoagency versus hyperagency). In §2 I focus on two intermediate 
cases of hypo- and hyper- agency. These are situations that, despite 
being very similar to pathological ones, may be successfully 
distinguished from them in virtue of quantitative factors (e.g. 
duration, frequency, intensity). I first explore the phenomenon of 
mind wandering as an example of hypoagency, and I then discuss the 
phenomenon of false confessions as an example of hyperagency. 
While cases of hypoagency exemplify situations where people 
experience their own thoughts, bodies, or actions as something 
beyond their control, experiences of hyperagency provide an illusory 
sense of control over actions or events. 
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The sense of agency of an individual is normally characterized in terms of 
self-attribution and self-ascription and is usually connected with an 
appropriate assessment of one’s actions. Feelings related to agency 
importantly include the sense of being able to do something, of being the 
agent of an action (Proust 2013), as well as the sense of being in control 
(Pacherie 2008). These capacities allow individuals to correctly determine 
the scope of their thoughts and actions, and also to reliably distinguish 
between self-generated and other-generated stimuli. When assessing one’s 
sense of agency, it is important to distinguish between the correctness of 
self-attribution and the subjective feeling of agency or control. 1  With 
respect to the former, one may self-attribute agency concerning the things 
she has not done or fail to self-attribute agency concerning the things she 
has in fact done. In other words, self-attribution may be correct or 
incorrect. By contrast, the feeling of agency or control comes in degrees: 
one may be more or less sure or confident about having performed an 
action. Disorders of agency could thus be described as cases where people 
encounter difficulties in the two senses just described. On the one hand, 
they may experience issues in terms of self-attribution and thus fail to 
correctly determine whether they performed the relevant action. On the 
other hand, they may experience a diminished (or unduly strong) feeling 
of agency or control. As I show later in the paper, there are cases in which 
these two senses of agency come apart and others in which they go 
together.  
 
In this paper I first characterize disorders of agency as lying on a spectrum. 
I then show that disturbances at both ends of this spectrum are connected 
to some mental disorders. On the one hand, a person may be unsure of 
whether she initiated an action that others attribute to her, or she might 
deny having done so despite evidence to the contrary. I call this kind of 
disturbance hypoagency. Extreme cases of hypoagency encompass 
phenomena such as auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH henceforth), 
thought insertion or alien hand syndrome, where people experience their 
thoughts or bodies as something acting beyond their control. On the other 
hand, a person may feel that events that are completely unrelated to her 
actions (or thoughts) fall under her own responsibility and therefore 
experience unbearable guilt as a result. This happens at times with 
 
1 In this paper I treat “agency” and “control” as synonymous, although I am aware that 
some finer-grained distinctions may be drawn between them (Pacherie 2007). For the 
purposes of my discussion, the feeling of agency and control seem to go hand in hand: 
gaining or losing control fundamentally implies augmenting or deteriorating one’s sense of 
agency. As a consequence, the two notions cannot significantly come apart, i.e. one cannot 
be in control without at the same time experiencing a sense of agency.   
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schizophrenic individuals, who tend to blame themselves for natural 
disasters, terrorist attacks, or murders committed by others. In these cases, 
subjects attribute to themselves a greater degree of agency and control than 
they actually possess, thereby exhibiting hyperagency. As I explain in 
more detail below, in both cases an underlying sense of agency appears to 
be compromised. On the one hand, extreme cases of hypoagency 
exemplify a situation in which self-attribution of agency is incorrect (i.e. 
thoughts and bodies are not experienced as one’s own) and the subject 
lacks a robust feeling of agency or control. On the other hand, extreme 
cases of hyperagency exemplify a situation in which self-attribution is also 
incorrect—albeit in the opposite direction (i.e. one believes to have 
performed actions that she has in fact not performed)—but the subject 
reports a strong feeling of agency. 
   
The paper is structured as follows. In §1 I explore the cases of AVH and 
pathological guilt and I explain how they lie at opposite ends of the agency 
spectrum. In §2 I focus on two intermediate cases of hypo- and hyper- 
agency: these are situations that—despite being very similar to 
pathological ones—may be successfully distinguished from them in virtue 
of quantitative factors. As an intermediate case of hypoagency I explore 
the phenomenon of mind wandering, where intrusive thoughts, memories, 
and feelings tend to pop up and interfere with the completion of other tasks. 
As an intermediate case of hyperagency, I discuss the phenomenon of false 
confessions, where people end up pleading guilty for crimes they did not 
in fact commit. 
 
 
1. Hypoagency and Hyperagency: Extreme Cases 
 
1.1. Hypoagency: Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVH) 
 
Disorders of hypoagency can be characterized as situations in which a 
person loses grip over her own thoughts or actions, thereby experiencing 
them as alien and beyond her control. One extreme example is the 
occurrence of AVH, also known as “hearing voices”. Although there is 
evidence that these experiences are frequent in non-clinical populations 
(Johns et al. 2014; Allen et al. 2006), as well as in depressive disorders 
(Toh et al. 2015), AVH are often taken to represent one of the hallmarks 
of schizophrenia (Henriksen, Raballo and Parnas 2015). Many researchers 
have suggested that AVH would result from failures in self-monitoring 
mechanisms (Frith 1992; Jones and Fernyhough 2007). These views 
characterize self-monitoring issues as failures to correctly predict action 
outcomes in several domains, such as motor behavior (e.g. self-tickling), 
cognition (e.g. planning difficulties), or inner speech (e.g. AVH). Issues 
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with self-monitoring are also likely to affect cognitive control and 
executive functioning at various levels, from implementing basic goals to 
carrying out higher order plans (Petrolini, Jorba and Vicente 2020). 
Applied to inner speech production, these difficulties may particularly 
affect what has been labeled “dialogic inner speech” (Fernyhough 2004), 
which refers to the conversations we have with ourselves. In this respect, 
inner speech in people experiencing AVH exhibits peculiar characteristics. 
For instance, AVH subjects appear to experience more intrusions in inner 
speech, often in the form of other people being present (Alderson-Day et 
al. 2014). Many describe the voices as exhibiting a markedly “alien” 
character and as differing sharply from first-person inner speech (Nayani 
and David 1996). People experiencing AVH also tend to appraise their 
inner speech as more negative (Hugdahl et al. 2012), dystonic—i.e. failing 
to align with the person’s self-attributed thoughts and emotions (Lopez-
Silva 2016), and fragmented—i.e. distributed across more than one “voice” 
without being temporally coordinated or synchronized (Langland-Hassan 
2008). Besides their relevance to inner speech, AVH showcase relevant 
facts about agency (Proust 2006) and ownership (Maiese 2015). Notably, 
they qualify as an experience in which sense of agency (i.e. X is caused by 
me, I am the author of X) and sense of ownership (i.e. X is mine, X is part 
of my experience) come apart. Indeed, in AVH subjects experience voices 
as alien—thereby denying authorship—but still as occurring within their 
bodily or mental boundaries in some significant sense—thereby preserving 
ownership (Proust 2013). In other terms, AVH experiences exhibit self-
misattribution as well as a diminished sense of agency or control.2 
 
A more detailed phenomenology of AVH may be garnered through the 
first-person account offered by Longden (2013). In her vivid report about 
the experience of “voice-hearing”, Longden recalls the first appearance of 
this phenomenon during her early college years. She describes her younger 
self as struggling with severe anxiety and worries about the future, but also 
as exhibiting a strong tendency towards suppressing her feelings. The first 
voice makes its appearance one evening while Eleanor is going home after 
a class: she characterizes it as neutral, similar to her own voice but 
narrating all her actions in third person, like a running commentary—e.g. 
“She is leaving the room”; “she is opening the door”. In the following 
weeks voices grow in number and intensity, becoming more persistent and 
menacing: in particular, they start threatening Eleanor and make her 
 
2  Another pathological case of hypoagency would be Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
(OCD), where subjects experience being compelled to act in a particular way or report a 
sense of performing an uncontrollable action (Szalai 2019). Yet, as opposed to what 
happens with AVH, OCD subjects tend to self-attribute actions correctly while 
experiencing a diminished sense of agency/control. In this sense, OCD may qualify as a 
clinically relevant, but less extreme disorder of agency.  
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comply with a series of bizarre tasks with the promise of “getting her old 
life back”. These tasks are experienced by Eleanor as some sort of “Labors 
of Hercules” over which she has absolutely no control, but that she 
nonetheless feels forced to carry to completion. She describes them as 
initially quite small (e.g. pull out a few strands of hair) but then as 
progressively more extreme (e.g. harm yourself) or violating social norms 
(e.g. pour a glass of water on the head of the instructor during a lecture). 
Notably, she experiences overwhelming feelings of powerlessness because 
she lacks the resources to exercise any form of control over the voices. Her 
agency appears so compromised that at one point she attempts suicide by 
trying to drill a hole in her head in order to get the voices out.  
 
The second part of Longden’s report is devoted to her process of recovery, 
which begins once she gets in touch with the UK-based Intervoice 
movement, founded in 1988 by psychiatrists Romme and Escher. The tenet 
of this therapeutic movement consists in claiming that voices should be 
treated as experiences rather than symptoms, and that the content of the 
voices often provides important insights into the person’s life story and 
personality. The primary goal of this approach is not to get rid of the voices 
per se, but to accept them while learning a series of coping strategies 
focused on “taking the power back” from them. The turning point towards 
recovery consists in realizing that voices may be appropriate responses to 
traumatic life experiences (e.g. childhood abuse) or ways to get in touch 
with one’s repressed emotions. For Longden this was clearly the case. 
During therapy she realizes that many of the voices—especially the more 
aggressive ones—were mirroring her hidden emotions: “Whenever I 
repressed anger (and that happened very often) the voice sounded 
frustrated” (Longden 2013). Another patient describes this phenomenon as 
follows: 
 
When the voices said: “See how awful she looks”, it happened 
on days when I felt myself pretty awful. But they always made 
such exaggerated statements. By exploring this I started to 
realize that in a certain way the voices expressed my own 
thoughts. It is rather strange, but they are your own thoughts 
about an emotion. (Romme and Morris 2013, 263-264) 
 
The treatment proposed by Romme and Escher appears particularly 
interesting for our purposes because it focuses on coping strategies to 
regain control over the voices (Romme and Escher 1993). Indeed, it could 
be seen as a way to enhance agency in people that experience a significant 
diminution in their power of controlling their mental events. Romme and 
Morris (2013) characterize recovery as a process of progressively gaining 
control over the voices by creating a dialogue with them, while at the same 
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time setting boundaries and avoiding being overwhelmed. Romme and 
Escher’s approach thus appears to counter hypoagency by strengthening a 
sense of familiarity with the voices. The more the patient learns to 
incorporate the voices in her experience and to treat them as legitimate (or 
at least revealing) aspects of her personality, the more agency over them is 
restored. 
 
1.2. Hyperagency: Pathological Guilt 
 
Pathological guilt represents an extreme case of hyperagency which is 
commonly experienced by people suffering from depression, although it 
may also be present, albeit in a different form, in schizophrenic patients. 
People experiencing pathological guilt tend to feel responsible for things 
that they have not done or feel deeply disturbed by actions and thoughts 
that are regarded as innocuous by others. What these cases have in common 
is the subject’s inability to properly assess the scope of their (moral) 
responsibility. Pathological guilt may manifest itself in different ways. 
Some people with schizophrenia attribute to themselves actions for which 
they are in fact not responsible—e.g. a murder that someone else 
committed. For example, Saks (2007) reports being filled with anxiety 
when reading the newspaper because she would blame herself for every 
violent crime reported in the area. Alternatively, some people suffering 
from depression assign a particularly negative valence to self-generated 
thoughts and events—e.g. feeling extremely guilty about finding another 
person annoying. Unlike AVH experiences, cases of pathological guilt 
combine incorrect self-attribution with an exaggerated feeling of agency 
or control over the relevant action or event. 
 
One interesting example comes from one of Freud’s earliest case histories, 
Emmy von N. (Freud and Breuer 1893, 48-105). Frau Emmy is a 40-year-
old woman who suffers from recurring hallucinations and from a number 
of tic-like movements, in particular an idiosyncratic “clacking sound” that 
would come up whenever she is anxious or frightened. While analyzing 
her case, Freud notices that the patient tends to be overly hard on herself 
and to feel directly responsible “for the least signs of neglect”: “If the 
towels for the massage are not in their usual place or if the newspaper for 
me to read when she is asleep is not instantly ready to hand” (Ibid., 65). 
One day, Freud arrives to the patient’s house to continue the therapy and 
finds her in a state of great distress, repeating: “Am I not a worthless 
person? Is it not a sign of worthlessness what I did yesterday?” Freud 
cannot recall what happened the day before to justify such a “damning 
verdict” (Ibid., 70). Despite Freud’s repeated admonitions not to feel guilty 
over small things, Emmy keeps behaving like “an ascetic medieval monk, 
who sees the finger of God or the temptation of the Devil in every trivial 
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event of his life and who is incapable of picturing the world even for a brief 
moment or in its smallest corner as being without reference to himself” 
(Ibid., 66). Notably, after a two-year long therapeutic process, Emmy is 
able to recover from the majority of symptoms—i.e. hallucinations, tics—
but her inclination to torment herself over “indifferent things” never 
vanishes completely.  
 
More recent accounts of melancholia—such as the one offered by Radden 
(2009)—suggest that Freud contributed to conceptualize depression as a 
state of mind characterized by self-criticism, where “dissatisfaction with 
the self on moral grounds” and “delusional expectation of punishment” 
stand out among the most typical clinical features (Freud 1917, 153). This 
point allows us to connect extreme forms of hyperagency with disturbances 
in one’s sense of confidence. Indeed, diminished confidence may play a 
role in over-attributing guilt to oneself in the face of negative events (e.g. 
“It happened to me because I am bad person”). It is thus unsurprising that 
pathological guilt is often found in the context of depressive disorders, in 
which self-loathing tends to feature prominently (see Plath 1963; Styron 
1991 for some first-person accounts). 
 
The pervasive presence of guilt feelings in some psychiatric disorders has 
also been explored by authors working in the field of psychology and 
philosophy of emotions. Frijda (1985), for instance, connects guilt with the 
sense of being in control: “[Guilt feelings] may provide an explanation for 
one’s misery, an explanation that provides an aspect of controllability, 
some shred of it, in the morass of helplessness; it permits acts of contrition 
and efforts at paying penance” (Frijda 1985, 431). In this sense, 
hyperagency may arise as an attempt to control and therefore justify or 
explain feelings of worthlessness and helplessness experienced in 
depression. Ratcliffe (2010) rather characterizes depressive guilt in terms 
of depth. As opposed to a circumscribed feeling of guilt about a specific 
action or event, depressed subjects tend to experience guilt as an “all-
encompassing way of being” (Ratcliffe 2010, 609). First-person reports of 
depressed patients support this idea: “The reason my life is so awful at 
these times is because I am a terrible, wicked, failure of a person”; 
“Everything that goes wrong in my life is directly my fault” (reported by 
Ratcliffe 2015, 135. Italics mine). In these cases—such as Freud’s patient 
Emmy—guilt shapes one’s perception and appraisal of other people, 
objects, and events. In this sense, pathological guilt shares important 
similarities with delusional beliefs: one’s belief of being responsible brings 
about an experience of reality in which environmental stimuli are 
overwhelmingly interpreted in light of such conviction (Bortolotti and 




In the next section I discuss some intermediate cases of hypo- and hyper- 
agency. Although these examples bear important similarities to the ones 
analyzed in §1.1. and §1.2., I show that they may be successfully 
distinguished from them by appealing to quantitative factors (e.g. duration, 
frequency, intensity). As an example of hypoagency I introduce 
phenomena such as distraction and daydreaming, where the sense of 
control over one’s thoughts appears moderately diminished. As an example 
of hyperagency I discuss the phenomenon of false confessions, in which 
people over-attribute responsibility to themselves to the point of accepting 
punishment for crimes they did not commit. 
 
 
2. Hypoagency and Hyperagency: Intermediate Cases 
 
2.1. Hypoagency: Mind Wandering 
 
Phenomena like distraction, daydreaming or mind wandering are 
extremely common in our everyday experience. We are working on an 
important project and we suddenly start thinking about the grocery list or 
our plans for the evening. We try to concentrate on a task when memories 
pop up and absorb us for some time before we are able to resume our 
previous activity. In most cases these thoughts arise automatically and are 
difficult to regulate. They can be seen as paradigmatic cases of hypoagency 
in which self-attribution is correct but the feeling of agency appears at least 
moderately diminished.  
 
Despite their pervasiveness in our ordinary life, phenomena of mind 
wandering have only recently become the object of systematic scientific 
investigation, mostly due to the growing number of neuroimaging results 
about brain activity in rest conditions. This neural pattern has come to be 
known as the Default Mode Network (DMN henceforth) and its discovery 
suggests that mind wandering might constitute a psychological baseline 
from which people depart when engaging in demanding tasks and to which 
they return when their attention is not allocated elsewhere (Mason et al. 
2007; Andrews-Hanna 2012). Although cases of excessive mind 
wandering have been at times granted pathological status (Schupak and 
Rosenthal 2009), this phenomenon has also been associated with an 
increase in creativity and problem-solving abilities. Indeed, the neural 
profile of brains in DMN is similar to the one exhibited by subjects 
engaged in conceptual processing and problem-solving tasks (Smallwood 
and Schooler 2006). In the past decade, researchers working in different 
fields—philosophy of mind, psychology and neuroscience in particular—
have attempted to shed light on the nature of mind wandering while 
formulating hypotheses of its adaptive value. Mind wandering has been 
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also characterized as a form of “mental autonomy loss” because of its 
spontaneous, automatic and task-unrelated nature (Metzinger 2013). The 
notion of mental autonomy proposed by Metzinger partially overlaps with 
what I call agency in this paper, and comprises the ability to causally 
determine one’s actions (self-attribution) as well as the ability to control 
the conscious content of one’s mind (feeling of agency or control). Due to 
the ubiquitous interruptions caused by mind wandering, Metzinger 
suggests that we should regard mental autonomy as “the exception rather 
than the rule” (Metzinger 2013, 5).  
 
On this view, mind wandering has several advantages, such as allowing 
individuals to maintain a baseline arousal activity where past, present and 
future mental events hang together in a (virtually) unitary whole. Similarly, 
mind wandering has been connected with a number of positive effects on 
psychological functioning, such as consolidating memories, planning 
future events and delaying gratification (Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna 
2013). This activity thus appears to grant the mind some freedom from the 
“here and now” and allows agents to perform mental actions that are not 
simply responses to the outside world. If this is correct, it becomes easier 
to see how mind wandering might be connected to creative and problem-
solving processes. In a recent study on the topic, Baird et al. (2012) 
assigned the Unusual Uses Task (UUT) to 145 participants, asking them to 
generate as many uses as possible for a common object (e.g. a brick) in a 
given amount of time. After having read the list of objects, three groups of 
participants were subject to an incubation period during which some 
subjects were administered a demanding task, others an undemanding task 
and still others were allowed to rest. A fourth group proceeded to solve the 
problem without taking a break. The results indicate that participants 
engaging in the non-demanding task during the incubation period 
performed significantly better than the ones who were assigned a 
demanding task, no task at all or that did not have an incubation period 
(Baird et al. 2012, 5). The researchers suggest that engaging in a simple 
task allowed participants to mind wander during the incubation period and 
this in turn helped them formulating more creative solutions to the UUT.  
 
As I suggest above, mind wandering can be regarded as a paradigmatic 
instance of hypoagency. It typically starts out as an automatic and 
spontaneous mental phenomenon over which we have little control. 
Moreover, we often have a hard time accounting for the content and origin 
of thoughts generated during mind wandering (e.g. when a song is stuck in 
our head). Notably, an instance of mind wandering may act as detrimental 
or beneficial from a psychological viewpoint: in other words, mind 
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wandering exhibits a dual nature.3 Let us assume that I have an important 
interview coming up and that I cannot concentrate on my PowerPoint 
preparation because my thoughts keep drifting away. Our discussion shows 
that this particular instance of mind wandering may acquire different 
valence depending on the context. On the one hand, external circumstances 
(e.g. how competitive the interview process is), my current emotional state 
(e.g. anxiety level), and broader personality traits (e.g. I may be prone to 
pessimistic fantasizing) may negatively affect my performance. On the 
other hand, as illustrated by Baird and colleagues, mind wandering while 
preparing for an interview might also turn out to be adaptive—e.g. if it 
allows me to creatively come up with original ideas or strategies. Another 
representation of the dual character of mind wandering comes from fiction. 
In Billy Wilder’s movie The Seven Year Itch (1955), the protagonist 
Richard Sherman experiences acute and recurring episodes of 
daydreaming. Throughout the movie, Richard indulges in several episodes 
of mind wandering that mostly revolve around seducing his new neighbor 
(interpreted by Marilyn Monroe). In one of his raving monologues, 
Richard vindicates imagination as one of his most defining character traits: 
“It’s just my imagination. Some people have flat feet. Some people have 
dandruff. I have this appalling imagination”. These mind wandering 
experiences, however, produce positive as well as negative effects. On the 
one hand, they give Richard—who is normally quite shy and neurotic—
the necessary confidence to invite her neighbor over for a drink and then 
out on a date. On the other hand, they fuel Richard’s paranoid thoughts as 
he keeps fantasizing about what would happen if his wife were to find out 
about the (still imaginary) affair.4 
 
What distinguishes the cases just described from extreme instances of 
hypoagency such as AVH? The two phenomena appear prima facie very 
similar in terms of duration and frequency. On the one hand, patients 
affected by AVH report that the experience of voice hearing becomes 
particularly distressing when the voices grow in number and intensity, 
 
3 See Lazarus and Folkman (1984) for a detailed discussion on dual factors, i.e. factors that 
act as risk-inducing or protective depending on the context. 
4 One might argue that even in these milder cases agency is impaired: we can’t get rid of 
the song stuck in our head, Richard Sherman cannot control his daydreaming episodes, etc. 
I do grant this point, although there seem to be different degrees of severity at play. 
Although in mind wandering cases the feeling of agency is surely diminished, correct self-
attribution is preserved: that is, we perceive the tune as “popping up from nowhere” but not 
as externally generated or inserted by someone else in our mind. By contrast, in extreme 
cases (such as AVH) the sense of agency is so disrupted that we completely lose the sense 
of what is self-generated and within our boundaries. Nothing in my account prevents this 
from happening with songs, provided that self-attribution also becomes incorrect and the 
song is then perceived as inserted, implanted, etc.  
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acting like a “running commentary” of one’s life (Longden 2013). On the 
other hand, researchers studying mind wandering indicate that subjects 
“spend almost half a day engaged in the experience” (Smallwood and 
Andrews-Hanna 2013, 1) or even “roughly two thirds of their lifetime” 
(Metzinger 2013, 6). A crucial difference between the two cases seems to 
be the person’s capacity to exercise a sufficient degree of control over the 
phenomenon. For instance, some aspects related to task-context (i.e. how 
demanding the activity is) might heavily influence the nature of the mind 
wandering episode, making it adaptive or disruptive as a result (Smallwood 
and Andrews-Hanna 2013). When we are engaging in a relatively non-
demanding task, the experience of mind wandering is likely to be less 
disruptive and more conducive to positive outcomes (e.g. creative 
solutions) because our mental resources need not be fully absorbed in the 
completion of the task at hand. Conversely, when the current task requires 
our undivided attention an episode of mind wandering qualifies as a 
distressful interruption. Therefore, one’s ability to regulate the context in 
which mind wandering episodes occur appears to play an important role: 
one might learn to confine mind-wandering to non-demanding situations— 
e.g. washing dishes—while fending it off from demanding ones (e.g. work 
or study). One might also learn to compartmentalize working or study time 
in order to devote designated unstructured spaces to mind wandering. This 
strategy appears to be successful as studies on creativity have consistently 
shown that original solutions to problems are more likely to arise when 
people allocate some unstructured time to mind wander (Dijksterhuis and 
Meurs 2006). Lots of interesting examples on how to implement these 
strategies are offered by the comedian John Cleese in his lecture about 
creativity (1991). While planning his weekly work schedule, Cleese makes 
sure to always leave a couple of slots open for creative thinking and treats 
them as serious commitments on a par with meetings, appointments, etc. 
He describes the rewards as extremely valuable: “If you just keep your 
mind resting against the subject in a friendly but persistent way, sooner or 
later you will get a reward from your unconscious, probably in the shower 
later. Or at breakfast the next morning, but suddenly you are rewarded, out 
of the blue a new thought mysteriously appears” (Cleese 1991).  
 
Notably, the process of gaining control over internally generated thoughts 
and speech acts is similar to the one described by recovering AVH patients. 
For instance, Longden (2013) learns to incorporate the voices in a larger 
autobiographical narrative and starts regarding them as neglected parts of 
her own self. Similarly, one of the patients treated by Romme and Escher 
(2013) talks about setting boundaries and being able to push back the 
unwanted intrusions to a later time: “I was already able to talk back to my 
voices with my thoughts, but I learnt to make a specific time of day, the 
evening, when I would focus, and simply tell the voices ‘later’ if they came 
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at another time” (263). The ability to exercise a certain degree of control 
within a paradigmatically uncontrolled activity may therefore be crucial to 
distinguish between ordinary, or even adaptive, cases of mind wandering 
and their pathological counterparts. 
 
2.2. Hyperagency: False Confessions 
 
False confessions are usually characterized as situations in which someone 
confesses to a crime that he or she has not committed, or significantly 
overstates his or her involvement during custodial interrogation 
(Gudjonsson 2003). These cases qualify as instances of hyperagency 
because someone who falsely confesses to a crime incorrectly self-
attributes an action that someone else has actually performed.  
 
The idea of non-mentally disordered people willing to face legal charges 
for something they have not done appears very counterintuitive. Yet, 
studies in forensic psychiatry show that false confessions are relatively 
frequent, although their exact number is obviously difficult to determine. 
For example, in the early Eighties 10% of the defendants assessed in 
Birmingham and 24% of those in the London pleaded “not guilty” at their 
trial after having provided the police with a written confession 
(Gudjonsson 2003, 184). In his extensive work on the topic, Gudjonsson 
shows that false confessions are not confined to the mentally ill and that 
“the view that apparently normal individuals would never seriously 
incriminate themselves when interrogated by the police is wrong” (Ibid., 
243). Forensic psychologists usually group false confessions into three 
categories: a) voluntary, where one spontaneously confesses without being 
interrogated, either to protect someone else or for pathological reasons— 
e.g. self-punishment; b) coerced-compliant, where one confesses as the 
result of an interrogation to obtain some immediate gain—e.g. escape from 
an intolerable situation, having one’s sentence reduced; c) coerced-
internalized, where one confesses as the result of an interrogation because 
he comes to believe that he has committed the crime (Gudjonsson 2003, 
192-195). Obviously c) cases are the most relevant to our purposes, 
because they comprise a mistaken self-attribution that the subject 
genuinely endorses. However, the discussion of real-life examples shows 
that the boundary between b) and c) is not always clear-cut. 
 
A famous case of coerced-internalized false confession is the one portrayed 
in Ava DuVernay’s series When They See Us (2019) which involves the 
men who came to be known as the “Central Park Five” (and later as the 
“Exonerated Five”). The series covers the prosecution and incarceration of 
five males of color, following the rape and assault of a white woman in 
Central Park in 1989. The first episode is almost entirely devoted to the 
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interrogations of the five suspects and provides several insights on how 
their false confessions came about. Following the trial, the five teenagers 
received sentences ranging from five to fifteen years in prison, until the 
actual perpetrator confessed to the rape in 2001 and the men were finally 
released.  
 
The way in which the Exonerated Five came to confess to a crime that they 
did not commit shows that the issue is quite complex. First, the methods 
used by the police during the interrogation play an important role, as well 
as the conditions in which the custodial confinement occurs—e.g. sleep-
deprivation, under- or over-stimulation, inadequate diet and physical 
discomfort. Some studies suggest that interrogation techniques may be 
responsible for eliciting memory distrust and distortion when combined 
with situations of emotional shock or extreme stress (Henkel and 
Coffmann 2004). The case of the Exonerated Five is particularly 
illustrative in this respect. Kevin Richardson, who was 14 at the time, was 
kept in police custody and interrogated for 18 hours nonstop without any 
family member present. Raymond Santana spent most of the interrogation 
in the presence of his grandmother, who did not speak English and only 
received spotty translations about crucial details of the crime. Antron 
McCray’s father was blackmailed by a police officer because of a past 
conviction that might have cost him his job, and ended up convincing his 
son to confess: “I want you to do what the police wants you to do. You 
need to say what they want you to say”.  
 
Second, false confessors usually exhibit a set of traits that make them 
particularly vulnerable to suggestion: young age, low self-confidence, 
exaggerated trust in authority, eagerness to help and difficulty in detecting 
discrepancies between what is recalled and what is suggested (Ofshe 
1989). Again, this is apparent in the Exonerated Five case, where the young 
age of the suspects (ranging from 14 to 17), the techniques of brutal 
coercion employed by the police, and the racially-informed power 
dynamics played a crucial role. In DuVernay’s series, the suspects are 
effectively manipulated by the detectives, who play them against one 
another in order to obtain partial confessions that would allow them to 
incriminate the group as a whole. Police officers use a variety of techniques 
that make it difficult to understand whether the resulting confessions would 
be merely compliant or also (partially) internalized. For instance, they 
pressure suspects by falsely claiming that others have already confessed 
and incriminated them (“‘Ray did it’, that’s what they say”), they blackmail 
them (“The sooner you tell us, the sooner you go home”), and they ask 
leading questions (“Who took off her shirt? Was it Antron?”). This way 
five people end up confessing to a crime they neither committed nor 
witnessed, either by admitting partial involvement (“It was like, I came 
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over to where everybody was at and where the lady was at, and I was trying 
to stop it and help her out, and I think, no… she scratched me, that’s how 
I got the scratch”, Kevin Richardson) or by fully confessing (“This is my 
first rape”, Korey Wise). 
 
What makes false confessions different from the instances of pathological 
guilt discussed above? There are some striking similarities between the two 
situations: in both cases, a subject falsely, although sincerely, comes to 
believe that s/he has done something that falls beyond his/her control, and 
takes moral as well as legal responsibility for it. In this sense, both 
internalized false confessions and cases of pathological guilt hinge on 
incorrect self-attributions originating from false memories.5 Moreover, a 
strong feeling of guilt features in both kinds of confessions. Many false 
confessors, for instance, feel guilty for not having been in control when the 
crime was committed (e.g. because of alcohol or drug intoxication), or for 
not being able to trust their memory in recalling events without confusion 
(Gudjonsson 2003). Despite these similarities, mentally disordered 
subjects appear to exhibit a pre-existing feeling of guilt that makes some 
of their actions particularly salient (e.g. Emmy von N), while false 
confessors experience guilt after having lost confidence about their ability 
to recollect what happened. As a consequence, the degree of internalization 
with respect to their confession differs; while voluntary confessions are 
rarely retracted, coerced-internalized confessions are usually taken back 
by the subject even if the timing of retraction varies from a few hours to 
several years (Gudjonsson 2003). In this sense, duration can be taken as a 
reliable indicator to distinguish between extreme and intermediate cases: 
the least pressured and the hardest to retract the confession, the higher its 
pathological import. This also leaves room for borderline cases: some false 
confessions may be characterized as transitory mental disorders from 
which people recover soon after the stressful situation has ended, while 
longer processes may indicate that the person has crossed a clinically 
relevant threshold.  
 
 
5 Assessing the degree of agency/control in these situations is obviously complex given that 
past events are involved. One option may be that false memories themselves originate from 
a disturbance in the sense of agency/control applied to the past. Alternatively, such a 
disordered sense of agency/control may apply to the subject’s own thoughts in the process 
of recollection, which might make it more difficult to distinguish between real and imagined 
(or witnessed) events. In this sense, internalized false confessions would be quite similar to 
illusion of control cases (Wegner and Wheatley 1999; Hohwy 2004), where agency 
misattributions are not simultaneous with the action but rather occur at a (slightly) later 
time.  
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Pathological and non-pathological cases may also differ in terms of 
urgency and intensity. For instance, psychotic subjects voluntarily contact 
the police and appear distressed for having committed the crime in question 
(“I did it”; “It was me”), whereas false confessors initially proclaim their 
innocence and then come to confess in a tentative fashion (“I must have 
done it”; “I think I did”). Protective factors such as strength and control 
play an important role as subjects often confess after a prolonged period of 
physical discomfort and psychological stress. Gudjonsson describes the 
process as follows: “The forces pushing people towards confessing are 
strengthened (e.g. persuading people that it is in their own interest to 
confess, that there is substantial evidence to link them to the crime) whilst 
forces maintaining resistance are weakened (e.g. by tiredness, lack of 
sleep, exhaustion, emotional distress)” (2003, 189). In this sense, one 
important difference between pathological and non-pathological cases may 
lie in the degree of effort required by the subject to regain a sufficient level 
of control over the situation. In some cases, the state of confusion and 
memory distortion leading to the false confession would fade quite easily, 
while in others the recovery process may take longer or fail to occur at all. 
 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper I discuss disorders of agency as cases in which people 
encounter difficulties in assessing their own degree of responsibility (self-
attribution), and/or as disturbances in their sense of being in control of their 
actions (feeling of agency or control). I substantiate the idea that agency 
should be conceived in dimensional terms by discussing examples where 
agency may be seen as “too little” (hypoagency) or “too much” 
(hyperagency). Notably, extreme cases of hypo- and hyper-agency map 
onto phenomena that are usually conceived as disordered, such as AVH or 
pathological guilt. However, seeing agency on a spectrum also allows us 
to discuss intermediate cases in which the sense of being in control is 
disturbed without giving rise to clinically relevant manifestations. 
Although some intermediate cases may still turn out to be problematic (e.g. 
false confessions), I show that others exhibit an adaptive nature in many 
circumstances (e.g. mind wandering). Discussing these examples also 
contributed to a better understanding of how different aspects of agency 
can come apart. For instance, in AVH both self-attribution and the feeling 
of agency appeared to be disrupted; in other cases—such as mind 
wandering—self-attribution is usually correct while the subject 
experiences a feeling of diminished control with respect to the relevant 
thoughts or actions. Obviously, there are many other cases that could be 
assessed along these dimensions and the examples discussed here are not 
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meant to be exhaustive. In the synthetic table below, I provide some further 

































Another core aspect of my discussion concerns the role played by 
quantitative factors such as duration, frequency, or intensity when it comes 
to distinguishing intermediate and extreme cases. These factors may play 
an important role in clinical practice, as they allow clinicians to improve 
case formulations and diagnoses of borderline or at-risk cases (Fusar-Poli 
et al. 2013). The focus on quantitative factors would also contribute to 
better track “the course of an illness” in longitudinal assessments, by 
monitoring how a patient’s sense of agency evolves over time and in 
correspondence of turning points such as onset, development, relapse, and 
(possibly) remission (McGorry et al. 2018). The work I propose here on 
the sense of agency is part of a broader project that includes multiple 
dimensions (i.e. familiarity, confidence, salience) that may come to be 
altered in different circumstances, giving rise to clinically relevant 
conditions. In this sense, agency should be taken as only one of the relevant 
dimensions of functioning whose extreme disruption gives rise to mental 
conditions as we know them. At the same time, embracing a dimensional 
approach also implies acknowledging that “disordered” states are only 
quantitatively different from “normal” ones, and that the boundaries 
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